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Protecting society: Biological security and 
dual-use dilemma in the life sciences-status 
quo and options for the future 
 
Christine Uhlenhaut, Reinhard Burger & Lars Schaade 
Life science research is a main pillar of health care; major discoveries 
have considerably improved life expectancy and quality of life. However, 
research, technologies and materials that can be used for good can also 
be misused to harm humans, animals or the environment. This dichotomy 
is described by the term ‘dual-use’, which applies to all scientific research 
that has the potential for doing both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Yet, societal support 
and acceptance for modern science crucially depends on the public having 
confidence in the protection from the potential ‘bad’, so the question is 
whether we, the society, are reasonably protected. 
 
The term dual-use was linked initially to the military sector and nuclear 
physics research at a time when it became obvious that nuclear fission 
could be used not only to create energy, but also to incinerate millions and 
destroy cities [1,2]. Control regimes such as the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were put in place to reduce the risk of 
abuse as much as possible, but the risks of potential misuse keep 
emerging in other fields of science, notably in computer science and the 
life sciences. 
 
Generally, the misuse of knowledge and research tools in the life sciences 
can be divided into three basic categories: criminal acts, biological 
weapons of mass destruction and bioterrorism. The 2001 attacks in the 
USA that killed five people by using anthrax-laced letters, however, 
changed how the life sciences and security interact and overlap. The dual-
use dilemma has again become the focal point of intense discussion within 
the life science community and—albeit catalysed by the media—among 
the general public. This renewed discussion was initiated by two 
transmissibility studies of H5N1 avian influenza virus [3,4]. These studies 
show hallmark features of dual-use research (DUR). Although they were 
aimed at finding ways to prevent a devastating influenza pandemic—in 
accordance with the WHO research agenda for influenza [5]—they 
involved the creation of modified, more transmissible viruses. This simple 
act seemed to enhance the chances of a pandemic, owing to either a lab 
accident or intentional release by terrorists. 
 
There are systems in place to deal with these risks. The first is ‘biosafety’: 
the safe handling of biological materials, including training, use of 
adequate protection and safe transportation of samples to prevent 
accidental release, contact or infection with a biological agent. The second 
system is ‘biosecurity’, which involves secure handling, access control for 
facilities and material, secure data storage and even publication policies. 
Security measures aim at preventing someone with malicious intent from 
accessing material or information that could be misused. A third term, 
  
‘biosurety’, tries to cover biosafety and biosecurity. Biosafety always has to 
be in place, whereas biosecurity measures have to be applied whenever a 
relevant risk becomes obvious, that is, when dual-use potential becomes 
apparent. However, almost all life science research can be abused for 
malicious goals, thus further differentiation is needed to focus on relevant 
research. This differentiation is achieved by separating general DUR from 
so-called dual-use research of concern (DURC). DURC has the added 
characteristics of immediacy and scope, meaning that it can be used 
directly, without any further work or modification, for malevolent purposes 
with potentially severe effects on public health. 
 
Stakeholders—including life science researchers themselves, as well as 
regulators, funding organizations and publishers—might be held partly 
responsible for a bioterrorist or criminal act. They, therefore, need to be 
aware of and acknowledge their responsibilities. As a prerequisite, they 
need to be able to identify research projects with DURC potential and 
know how to handle these appropriately. The tools to do so are education 
and guidance on the basis of laws, guidelines and regulations, but also on 
ethics and personal initiative. One example of self-regulation is the 
Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA that was held in response to 
concerns about the risks of the, then new, field of molecular biology. 
Biologists in the field agreed on a research moratorium and discussed 
appropriate ways to mitigate risks. In the end, this conference laid the 
ground for the biosafety levels of today [6]. 
 
During the H5N1 discussion, some called for a new Asilomar Conference 
to deal similarly with biosecurity and especially with dual-use concerns. 
However, the original conference was solely dedicated to biosafety and 
involved fewer stakeholders—overall, 55 scientists, lawyers, historians and 
ethicists took part [7]. Today’s issues are more complex: many 
researchers are already working in areas with DURC potential, and we 
have to deal with technologies, agents and rapidly increasing amounts of 
data. Researchers are working for different laboratories and institutions—
government and universitylaboratories, biotech companies, the 
pharmaceutical industry or military laboratories. Therefore, financial, 
political, ethical or religious concerns might play a role, especially when it 
comes to subjects such as stem-cell research [8]. Stakeholders in the 
biosecurity debate have many roles and obligations, with biosecurity often 
being an appendix to their everyday work. 
 
In the past, the standard training of life scientists did not focus on or even 
include biosafety, biosecurity or bioethics, with the exception of ethics 
applied to clinical trials or animal use. Yet, scientists have to evaluate the 
potential impact of their research on society when they plan a project, as it 
is being carried out and when they publish the results. This 
evaluationshould be on the basis of comprehensive risk–benefit analysis 
which can become complex. It can, therefore, require support from other 
experts also to avoid any individual bias on the part of the researchers. 
Other ways to minimize this risk are to use specific guidelines or software 
tools designed for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity risk management, 
  
such as BioRAM [9]. 
 
The way that such a risk–benefit analysis is conducted obviously depends 
on the institution within which the research is carried out. The interests, 
resources and capabilities of research institutions vary greatly, depending 
on size, finances and the ‘setting’; is it a public health institute, a university 
or a military research facility? The setting might also influence risk percep-
tion by the institution and the employees. Again, standardized tools could 
provide guidance to ensure the risk evaluation is comparable between 
different institutions and fields of research. 
 
Research is generally funded either by governments or private institutions. 
The act of funding implies a certain responsibility for the intentions and 
outcomes of the funded project. To address this issue, several major 
funding agencies have enacted codes of conduct. Examples include the 
codes of the German Max Planck Society, the German Research 
Foundation and The Wellcome Trust [10–12]. The US government and the 
European Union (EU) also published codes of conduct for publicly funded 
research [13,14]. However, these guidelines or policies are only applicable 
for those who receive funding from those organizations or governments, 
and thus leave out independently financed or industry-based research. 
 
Publication is an integral part of research. Journal editors spend their time 
reviewing manuscripts for their own scientific merits and to guarantee 
scientific reliability, not for potential biosecurity issues. In many journals, 
editors are often scientists who volunteer and are usually not paid for their 
work. As such, there are few training requirements. Is it, therefore, 
reasonable and realistic to expect editors to competently judge the DURC 
potential of a submitted manuscript? A survey showed that few editors had 
experience of biosecurity reviews, and those who had experience had 
never rejected a publication on those grounds [15]. This is reflected by 
data from Nature-branded journals: in a period of four years, about 74,000 
biology submissions were received by different Nature-branded journals, 
28 of these were flagged for DURC potential and reviewed separately. It 
was concluded that all of them were DUR but not DURC, thus no papers 
were rejected because of biosecurity concerns [16]. 
 
Whilst most editors agree that they have a responsibility to be vigilant, 
there is a general lack of guidance on how to identify and judge the DURC 
potential of a manuscript. It is true that a group of journal editors and 
authors have described basic requirements and recommendations [17] 
and that many journals have established policy guidelines, but these are 
not universal. The initial recommendation to publish the H5N1 studies only 
in part might be considered as a prominent example of this lack of 
guidance. Not until then did it become obvious that there were no 
mechanisms in place for publishing manuscripts in part, whilst at the same 
time providing full access to the results for some ‘chosen’ researchers. 
 
Mechanisms to allow or facilitate decision-making can be provided by 
different ‘tools’, such as codes, guidelines or laws. The strongest tools are 
laws, which are enforceable, whereas guidelines are the weakest. 
  
Between these two extremes are several codes—aspirational codes (often 
referred to as codes of ethics), educational codes (codes of conduct) and 
enforceable codes (often part of broader guidelines or regulations; [18]). 
Codes can also be distinguished according to their intention—they can 
echo existing provisions (codifiers) or refine and explain given rules 
(clarifiers). 
 
Historically, there are specific international treaties and laws to prevent the 
proliferation of biological weapons of mass destruction, such as the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [19] and the related United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The EU also has directives and 
regulations governing biotechnology. An EU directive has to be 
transposed into national law by member states that can adapt the law to 
match their own requirements. By contrast, a regulation directly and 
equally applies in every EU member state. An example for biosecurity-
relevant EU legislation is the guidance on export controls [20]. 
 
At the national levels, laws differ widely in terms of specificity and 
restrictiveness. Only few countries have adopted specific biosecurity laws. 
Denmark adopted a Biosecurity Law in 2008 that is comprehensive and, 
among other provisions, requires the monitoring of specified equipment. 
Many other countries rely on combinations of existing laws from different 
areas, such as biosafety or export controls. Germany, for example, has 
several laws that govern aspects of biosecurity but no specific national 
code or law. These laws include the Act on Genetic Engineering, the War 
Weapons Control Act, the Foreign Trade Act, the Protection against 
Infection Act and the Biological Agents Ordinance. Although most dual-use 
issues are covered this way, these provisions might be insufficient to deal 
with the possible misuse of new developments, technologies and 
knowledge.  
 
The USA has implemented a range of domestic laws, regulations and 
guidelines for biosecurity. The Government Policy for Oversight of Life 
Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern has come into force in 2012 [14]. 
This policy is supposed to result in regular stock-taking of research on 15 
specific agents and toxins for seven defined categories of experiments. It 
has already been pointed out that considering only 15 agents, which are 
already tightly regulated by other means, would not cover enough ground. 
Looking at previously identified studies with DURC potential, it is obvious 
that not all of these would fall under this policy [21]. Examples of these 
studies are the inadvertent creation of a deadly mousepox virus [22] and 
the de novo synthesis of both polio virus [23] and SARS-like bat corona 
virus [24]. Furthermore, the policy applies only to US government-funded 
or government-conducted research, whereas privately funded or industry 
research is not covered. 
 
There are international guidelines, such as the WHO guidelines in the 
context of the H5N1 studies [25]. Other relevant WHO documents are the 
Biosafety Manual [26], which also discusses biosecurity for the first time at 
this level, and the Biorisk Management Guidance, which aims to provide 
leads for developing national approaches that can merge both traditional 
  
biosafety and new security concerns [27]. Another WHO report offers 
guidance for addressing the risks of laboratory accidents or potential 
deliberate misuse [28]. These documents are recommendatory in nature, 
but are often used as a foundation for more binding national regulations. 
Other examples include standards provided by the European Committee 
for Standardization, such as the Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard 
[29].  
 
Codes of ethics are typically short, general in nature and seek to build 
consensus on the basis of ethical considerations. The most prominent 
example is the Hippocratic Oath. The Pugwash Conferences on Science 
and World Affairs drafted a code of ethics that asks for the active ethical 
engagement of scientists. The code demands that scientists refuse “to 
engage in any research, development or use of science that is unethical, 
in particular, that is intended to facilitate—or when there is a real possibility 
of its being misused to facilitate—biowarfare or bioterrorism, both of which 
violate the fundamental moral values of humanity” or “take steps to 
prevent any research or use of science that is unethical especially that 
which could facilitate biowarfare or bioterrorism and, in particular, the 
misuse or potential misuse of one’s own discoveries, teachings, 
knowledge, or scientific advancements for such purposes…” [30]. 
Therefore, this code demands that scientists take responsibility beyond the 
laboratory door and consider what consequences their research might 
have in a wider, societal context. 
 
National codes of conduct have been developed by the National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which published several 
recommendations and guidelines [31–37], including a toolkit for “promoting 
awareness and responsibility in dual use research” [34]. The Netherlands 
Code of Conduct for Biosecurity offers guidance but has to be 
implemented independently by institutions [38]. This code also 
recommends establishing a National Biosecurity Centre that would monitor 
scientific developments relevant to biosecurity, coordinate information and 
education, and carry out other networking and supportive functions. 
 
Industry also has some codes of conduct. The International Association 
Synthetic Biology developed Best Practices in Gene Synthesis [39]. Their 
publication contains considerations for risk assessment and risk 
management regarding sequence analysis, but also recommends 
cooperation with national authorities in the case of potential 
illegalactivities. 
 
Several international initiatives are working towards the goal of global 
biosurety—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[40], the Global Health Security Initiative [41], the Australia Group [42], the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [43], Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs [44] and the WHO. Valuable 
resources can also be found at national institutions, notably the Fink 
Report [45] and the Lemon–Relman Report [46], both published by the US 
National Academies of Science. 
 
  
The Fink Report names seven categories of research that warrant caution 
and calls for the implementation of institutional review boards. The NSABB 
was created as a consequence of the Fink Report. The Fink Report 
focuses on national structures and issues, whereas the Lemon–Relman 
Report deals with the same issues on a global level. It also focuses on 
freedom of research and exchange of information whilst supporting 
awareness-building and shared responsibility of scientists on an 
international level. 
 
From the point of view of scientists, there are many reasons to be con-
cerned when it comes to biosecurity. As biosafety is a prerequisite for 
most lab work, there are standard operating procedures, guidelines and 
laws governing the issue. These provisions can be developed on the basis 
of known facts about preventing infection and occupational health and 
safety rules. Furthermore, the usefulness and imperativeness of 
implementing sound biosafety measures is beyond controversy. However, 
biosecurity is a different matterand, for many laboratories and institutions, 
a new concern. Compared with the well-established field of biosafety, 
there are limited guidelines and regulations that deal explicitly with 
biosecurity. The availability of these guidelines depends crucially on the 
setting of the research. Traditionally, military research facilities already 
have high security standards compared with, for instance, a university 
laboratory. Furthermore, establishing biosecurity measures requires 
resources in terms of personnel and finances, and they might 
consequently hamper research. It is probable that additional biosecurity 
measures would have to be paid for with research funds, leavingless 
money for the actual research. 
 
Time is another constraint that applies to both training and the conduct of 
research. University curricula are already filled; adding a new subject 
would require leaving something else out, and implementing biosecurity 
involves administrative efforts that become time-consuming. Furthermore, 
if a more comprehensive review becomes necessary, the details of a 
proposed project might have to be shared with other researchersin the 
field who are competitors. 
Lastly, some researchers might not receive the visas needed for pursuing 
their research in laboratories abroad owing to security concerns. Similarly, 
cooperation might become impossible because security clearance cannot 
be obtained in all countries. Thus, implementing biosecurity is often 
perceived to have negative effects on the viability of projects, and related 
restrictions can lead to competitive disadvantages. This might prompt 
some scientists to move to countries with fewer constraints. In the light of 
these obstacles, how can we implement biosecurity with the least negative 
effects on research and scientific freedom? 
 
The stakeholders involved have to agree on biorisk assessment, on the 
appropriateness of research projects and the limits to research. On the 
one hand, limiting scientific freedom would clash with good scientific 
practice, which is based on openness, accessibility and reproducibility. 
Furthermore, it could have negative effects on public health and health 
  
care in general. On the other hand, concerns expressed by the security 
sector should be taken seriously. 
 
These two communities—life sciences and the security sector—have to 
find common ground and be willing to adapt to a new situation, which is 
challenging for some. There are already concerns regarding the 
securitization of public health and the WHO [47]. In addition, many in the 
scientific community are doubtful whether secrecy would even be a 
suitable security measure [48]. In addition to bridging these differences in 
opinion, the two sectors need to find a common nomenclature and 
understanding on a global level when it comes to risk perception and 
assessment. So far, there is no measure to weigh security risks against 
benefits in other sectors such as public health, economics, science and 
even security benefits. Furthermore, those who assess the risks are often 
biased by different interests, experiences and perceptions. Therefore, it is 
imperative to have not only “breadth of expertise”, but also “breadth of 
perspective” [49]. 
 
A suitable path towards a global consensus would be an international 
code of conduct or ethics based on the WHO guidelines and further 
complemented by components from national codes. To gain global 
recognition for a fundamental code, all relevant bodies and institutions 
should be represented on a biosurety board. A representative assembly 
could be facilitated by a supranational and impartial organization such as 
the United Nations or the WHO. The WHO concept for biorisk man-
agement already takes naturally occurring diseases, laboratory accidents 
and deliberate releases into account, and is a comprehensive approach to 
biosurety. The concept is based on three pillars: research excellence, 
ethics, and biosafety and biosecurity. The suggested tools for biorisk 
management have different levels of strictness. They include research 
oversight mechanisms, the policies of funding agencies, publishers and 
editors, selected laws and regulations, codes of conduct and ethics, 
awareness-raising and educationalinitiatives [28]. 
Supplementing a global code of conduct with national codes of ethics and 
conduct would integrate existing domestic provisions and generate more 
specific codes. This restriction would allow us to focus on specific needs 
whilst taking into account available resources and infrastructure. 
Development of these codes should be initiated and managed by relevant 
stakeholders from academia, institutions, funding organizations and 
scientific societies. In some cases, existing national regulations could be 
reassessed and eventually restructured to reduce the strong compartmen-
talization seen in many regulatory agencies. Establishing independent 
national commissions for biosecurity could provide leadership for 
developing guidance, and provide the interface needed between science, 
securityand politics. 
 
The next level of a comprehensive global biosurety network would be to 
commit organizations and institutions to establish specific codes. On this 
level, it would become feasible to develop concise guidance on how to 
assess biosecurity risks and DURC potentials, thus rendering the risk 
assessment less burdensome. Customized solutions would also allow the 
  
inclusion of specific requirements, such as physical security on the basis 
of the actual facility. Furthermore, institutions or organizations should 
consider appointing a competent person or group who can provide advice 
and guidance on DURC issues, as not every individual within the 
institution can be expected to be an expert in the field. 
 
Perhaps the most important step is to raise awareness and improve 
education about DURC, as stipulated in a report by ethics experts [13]. 
There are bio-safety officers at present, but there are hardly any 
designated offices or individuals in charge of biosecurity, or any formal 
training for biosecurity officers—there are only a few international training 
options. However, this might change in the future. There seems to be 
ample support for multinational training and the establishment of 
biosecurity networks that would improve global consensus-building and 
the exchange of experiences. A good example was set by a 
multidisciplinary course arranged by Public Health Canada and the 
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University, 
which combined international biosafety, dual-use biosecurity and bioethics 
[50]. If they cater to participants from many countries, such courses can 
both provide education and further international cooperation and trust-
building. However, this was only one pilot course and it remains to be seen 
whether it will mature into a training option. Other resources include online 
training tools—for instance, those developed at the Office of 
Biotechnology Activities at the National Institutes of Health and NSABB 
[51]. 
 
Training requires qualified teachers and mentors. As the subject of 
biosurety is relatively new, there are only a few individuals capable of 
covering all aspects. Therefore, programmes for ‘training the trainers’ 
would have to be the first layer of implementing educational initiatives. 
Training the trainers is one issue, educating the scientific and security 
community is an even more challenging one. There are hardly any training 
opportunities for students; studies of university curricula have shown that 
biosurety issues are rarely addressed [52,53]. It is crucial to involve young 
academics in biosurety and offer appropriate training, as this will be an 
integral part of their career. 
 
Laws, codes and guidelines cannot guarantee that all possible biosurety 
contingencies are adequately covered—individual responsibility and ethics 
are at least as important as legal provisions. Overall, implementing 
biosurety is a giant balancing act that we have to master in the near future: 
“Responsible decision-making is required by actors at all levels. Decision-
makers will need to make judgements to resolve difficult cases of conflict-
ing values. Scientific freedom, scientific progress, public health, safety and 
security are all important values, and none should be given absolute 
priority over the others. Conflict between these values, in any case, is not 
always inevitable” [28]. 
 
So, the question of whether society is protected from the malicious use of 
biological agents can, for now, only be answered conditionally. We still 
have to do some soul-searching and find consensus among the research 
  
and security communities, among different kinds of research institutions 
and among nations. The results of these deliberations will hopefully lead to 
a comprehensive, globally harmonized, biosurety network. 
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